Abstract. In practice, web-based single sign-on(SSO) protocols, such as OpenID, SAML, and OAuth, have been widely used in cloud computing services due to its convenience to users. However, these SSO authentication schemes require a fully trusted third party to help achieve mutual authentication, which makes the trusted third party being a bottleneck of security. Moreover, they do not protect users' privacy: the trusted third party learn at which service a user logs in. To address these issues, in this work, we design an efficient and provably secure SSO protocol based on identity-based authentication using a secure channel binding, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). The proposed SSO scheme can achieve mutual authentication without the help of the trust third party. Furthermore, our scheme can resist against various kinds of attacks and is able to provide user privacy.
Introduction
Cloud computing is based on various kinds of exposing resources over the internet which provides shared computer processing resources and data to computers and other devices on demand [1] . There are many services of cloud computing, such as data storage, data management, medical system, etc. In practice, users access these cloud-based services through web browsers, such as HTTP or HTTPS. To access these different cloud services, the user needs to log in each service provider with different identities and passwords according to traditional authentication schemes. Thus, the user needs to manage many identities and passwords. Single sign-on(SSO) schemes have been introduced into cloud service environment to address this problem [2, 3] .
The benefit of SSO authentication such as Passport [4] and OpenID [5] is huge, which requires the user to provide only one identity and password to access multiple service providers. However, there are also two problems for traditional SSO authentication schemes. First, these schemes require a fully trusted third party to help achieve mutual authentication, this may make the trusted third party being a bottleneck of security [6, 7] . Second, these schemes do not protect users' privacy. The trust third party always learns at which service provider a user logs in. Thus, the trust third party can easily track users [8] . A privacy-respecting SSO system for the web proposed by Fett et.al.'s [8] is a good candidate to tackle the second problem, but this scheme still requires a trust third party to help authentication. In fact, exchanging users data between the trust third party and service providers in every authentication process will leak users' privacy. Therefore, if the first problem is resolved, the second problem would not exist.
In this paper, we present an SSO protocol without the help of trusted third party based on identity-based authentication and the latest TLS standard. This proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication and establishes secure channel by combining TLS with SSO. Besides, our scheme can resist various attack.
The Proposed Scheme

Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, registration center(RC) chooses an additive group of point G with order q, and P is a generator of G. RC generates the system private key sk and calculates
Then RC chooses five secure hash functions
. RC publishes the system parameters {G,q,P,PK,h 0 ,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3 ,h 4 }.
User Registration Phase
When the user U i wants to access a service provider, he/she needs to register in RC first. The process of registration is as follows.
(1) U i selects identity ID i and password PW i , generates a random number 
Authentication Phase
When U i wants to login the service provider S j , U i needs to access to S j through TLS. Then, U i and S j establish a secure channel and S j has been authenticated to U i though TLS protocol. As shown in Fig. 1 , the process of authentication is as follows. (1) U i inputs ID i and PW i into smart card 
Then U i transmits C on the secure channel to S j .
(4) S j computes
is established. If not, S j fails to authenticate the user U i , and the session is terminated. Otherwise, S j verifies U i successful.
Password Update Phase
When the user U i wants to update the password, he/she should run as follows:
(
, and checks whether i V ′ and V i are equal. If not, the smart card fails to authenticate U i , and rejects the request of password update.
(3) Finally, F* i and V* i are stored in the smart card to replace F i and V i respectively.
SECURITY ANALYSIS Security Model
Based on Tsai and Lo's work 6], we proposed a security model for our scheme. The security of our scheme is defined by a game played by the adversary A and a challenger ζ . Let instance ∏ is negligible. The probability of A knew the password is negligible.
Provable Security
To prove the security of our proposed scheme, we assume that our scheme is defined by a game played between the adversary A and a challenger ζ . Lemma 1. (Secure user authentication): In the proposed scheme Π, if the hash function (h 0 ,h 1 ,h 3 ,h 4 ) are ideal random function and s S ∏ has accepted, then no polynomial adversary against the proposed scheme can forge a legal authentication message with a non-negligible probability. Proof. We assume that the adversary A can forge a legal authentication message with a non-negligible probability ϵ. Then there is a challenger ζ can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible probability.
Given an instance (P,RK= sk·P) of DL problem, the task of ζ is to compute * q Z sk ∈ . ζ sends the system parameters {G,q,P,PK,h 0 ,h 1 . Therefore, the forged authentication messages are the following two equations:
Based on equations (1) and (2), we derive the following equations:
is the answer to DL problem. We now analyze the probability of ζ solving the DL problem. We assume that A forges user U C and pass user authentication successfully with non-negligible probability ϵ, and the attack at least once among q s sessions. Therefore the probability of A pass user authentication in this session is ϵ/q s . When we repeat the simulation with a different choice h 1 , and the attack at least once among q s +1 session. Therefore, the probability that ζ can solve the DL problem is ϵ/q s (q s +1).
It is clear that the probability of ζ solving the DL problem is non-negligible due to ϵ is non-negligible. Obviously, it is a contradicts assumption. Therefore, there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legal authentication message with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme is secure protocol if DL problem is hard. Proof. Based on Lemma 1, we can know that there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legal user login if DL problem is hard. Besides, if we have asked corrupt (ID i , SC i ) query and knew the secret data in the smart card, the probability of the adversary knew the password
, which is negligible. According to the definition 2, the proposed scheme is a secure protocol.
Further Security Analysis of Our Scheme
Resistance to User Impersonation Attack: In our scheme, in order to impersonate as U i , the adversary has to generate a valid login request (F i ,PW i ), where F i stored in the device. An adversary who wants to impersonate user U i must know the user's password and smart card at the same time. If the adversary has obtained one of the two factors, he still does not know any information of another factor. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist user impersonation attack.
Resistance to Replay Attack: In our improved scheme, we use a random number to prevent the replay attack. The random xt is fresh and different at every authentication. Therefore, when the user sends login request, it must be the current session, not previous session. So, our scheme can avoid the replay attack.
Two-factor Security: Obviously, the adversary is not able to impersonation user when he only knows the user's password. On the other hand, suppose the adversary steals the user's smart card and obtain the data (F i ,V i ),
The adversary cannot guess the correct password, because there exist
candidates of password, where |D PW | is the space of password. This is called fuzzy verifier method [9] , where the adversary is prevented from obtaining the exacting correct password. Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide two-factor security.
Resistance to Wrong Password Login/update Attack: In our scheme, secret information are equal. Therefore, our scheme can quickly detect unauthorized login/update with the wrong password.
Mutual Authentication: Services provider S j is authentication to U i based on TLS protocol, which has been proved security. According to the proofs of Theorem 1, there is no polynomial adversary that can forge a legal user authentication message. Thus, the user and the service provider can successfully authenticate each other.
Conclusions
In this paper, based on identity-based authentication we proposed an efficient and provably secure SSO authentication scheme over TLS. The proposed scheme fulfills mutual authentication without the help of RC. Moreover, through the formal security analysis, we have shown that our scheme can resist various known attack and provide more security features.
